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Abstract 
 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), 
which coordinate delivery for over two-thirds of the 
electricity consumed in the U.S., are required by the 
FERC to employ stakeholder-driven mechanisms to 
establish market and operational rules. These 
“governance structures” set up a quasi-political 
process for determining which market rules are adopted 
and which are not. This study shows how governance 
systems are not simply administrative constructs but 
have real impacts – the details of how the market rules 
are made will ultimately affect market outcomes. Using 
the capacity market in the PJM Interconnection as a 
case study, we model the preferences of individual 
stakeholders over different capacity market designs, 
under different decision rules for which capacity market 
design is implemented. We compare capacity market 
design choices under PJM’s current decision system, 
which requires a super-majority in a sector-weighted 
voting context to implement a new market rule, with the 
decision systems used in the New York ISO and also 
under systems of preferential voting. This voting model 
is integrated with a model of capacity market clearing 
which allows us to demonstrate how different decision 
systems matter in terms of installed capacity and 
capacity market outcomes. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This study aims to show how the governance of 
regional transmission organizations (RTOs) is not just 
an administrative system but has a measurable impact 
on the electricity market. Our definition of 
“governance” primarily includes the administrative 
processes that each RTO has for establishing market and 
operational rules. The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) requires RTOs to include some 
level of stakeholder engagement in establishing market 
and operational rules, but the mechanisms for 
stakeholder engagement vary widely by RTO [1]. The 
RTOs serving New England, New York and the Mid-
Atlantic region confer substantial influence on 
stakeholders, who vote on whether specific rule changes 
should be filed with FERC. Other RTOs use 
stakeholders in a more advisory capacity. The definition 
of a “stakeholder” varies between RTOs – in the context 
of this paper (as in [2-4]) market participants are 
considered stakeholders, but other interested parties 
such as environmental groups and state regulators are 
not considered stakeholders. We explore different 
governance systems, especially voting rules, and show 
how different voting rules change market outcomes 
which can be presented in dollar terms. 
The potential connection between RTO governance 
and market performance was first raised by Dworkin 
and Goldwasser [5] but has received more attention in 
the past few years [6-9]. We add to this growing 
literature on RTO governance by providing more direct 
and quantitative evidence of a relationship between 
RTO governance and market outcomes. As a specific 
case study, we explore different decision mechanisms 
that could be applied to the PJM voting system and show 
how these differences could change market outcomes in 
PJM’s capacity market.  
Previous work focusing on decision mechanisms in 
the PJM stakeholder process [2-4] showed that under the 
current voting system in PJM (which requires a 
supermajority in the context of sector-weighted voting, 
as described further in Section 2), stakeholders in PJM 
would have great deal of difficulty passing any proposal 
for capacity market reform. A strong coalition of end-
users could prevent the passage of any market rule 
change that would tend to increase capacity prices. 
Existing analyses have also found that a small number 
of swing voters preventing passage of market rule 
changes that would tend to decrease capacity prices.  
Results from prior work raise the question of the 
importance of the specific voting structure in which 
market rule proposals pass or fail. In addressing this 
question, we focus on two mechanisms for changing 
RTO decision systems: elimination of the supermajority 
requirement for voting and the use of preferential voting 
in which voters rank options in an order of their 
preference. Our approach builds a joint model of the 
stakeholder process by which the capacity market rules 
are established that is integrated with a model of 
capacity market clearing. We use this model to simulate 
voting outcomes under different decision systems, and 
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then use the capacity market model to estimate the 
market implications of those systems. 
The modeling approach described and implemented 
in this paper is able to connect the process of making 
decisions on market rules with outcomes in those 
markets. The importance of this has been suggested in 
the existing literature on RTO governance [2-5] but has 
not previously been implemented. This work also adds 
to the literature on interactions between individual and 
group preferences and outcomes in the power grid and 
electricity markets [10]. Our approach involves four 
steps. 
1. Develop a candidate set of market rule revisions. 
2. Model preferences of RTO stakeholders over these 
candidate market revisions. In this paper we use the 
method from [4], with a modification to handle 
cases where preferences may be ambiguous. 
3. Model the voting outcome under different decision 
systems to determine which market rule is adopted. 
4. Model the implementation of the adopted market 
rule and compare those modeled outcomes to actual 
outcomes (if historical data is available) or 
outcomes that would have prevailed under a 
different market rule. 
We illustrate this approach using PJM’s stakeholder 
process and capacity market. We model the preferences 
of each stakeholder in PJM over different parameters of 
the Variable Resource Requirement (VRR) curve, 
which is used as the demand curve in capacity market 
clearing. An actual set of proposed VRR curve reforms 
from 2011 is used as our set of candidate market rules. 
Based on these preferences, we model the prevailing 
VRR curve under different voting passage thresholds 
than PJM currently uses, and also under three different 
preferential voting models. In the case of the PJM 
capacity market, we find that either lowering the voting 
passage threshold or the use of a preferential voting 
mechanism enhances the political power of end-use 
customers in PJM and would lead to capacity market 
rules that would lower prices but also lower the level of 
installed capacity. The magnitude of the market impact 
of these different voting rules is highly sensitive to 
several market parameters, but the voting mechanism 
itself clearly has an impact. 
In section 2, we explain the current voting rules of 
PJM and introduce alternative voting rules that we 
consider in this study. Section 3 shows how we modeled 
supply and demand curve in the capacity market to 
connect voting outcomes and market outcomes. Section 
4 illustrates how we identified preference order and 
describes simulation results of expected voting outcome 
(and so the market outcome) under different voting 
rules. Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts and 
directions for future research. 
 
2. Modeling RTO Decision Systems  
 
This section introduces the different voting rules 
considered in this paper, as follows: 
• PJM’s current voting system, which uses sector 
weighted voting with a supermajority required for 
passage of a rule change; 
• The voting system used in the New York ISO, 
which is similar to PJM but with different sector 
weights and a different passage threshold; 
• Three preferential voting procedures: Instant 
Runoff Voting, Coombs Rule and Borda Count. 
 
Preferential voting systems all require voters to express 
preferences over different alternatives, rather than 
asking them to choose one alternative. While there are 
drawbacks [11-13], proponents of the preferential 
voting system argue that it is less vulnerable to strategic 
voting, and it ensures winners to get majority when there 
are more than two alternatives [14-16]. Given the 
difficulties in passing capacity market reforms in PJM 
through its existing stakeholder process, preferential 
voting models are of particular interest. 
 
2.1. PJM’s Voting Rule  
 
This section contains an abbreviated description of 
stakeholder voting in PJM; for a more detailed 
description, [2] or [4]. Each stakeholder in PJM must 
assign itself to one of five industry sectors: Generation 
Owners (GO), Transmission Owners (TO), Electric 
Distributors (ED), End-Use Customers (EUC), and 
Other Suppliers (OS). Compared to the other sectors that 
have reasonably intuitive definitions, the OS sector is 
very heterogeneous, including Curtailment Service 
Providers (or demand response aggregators), Muni/co-
op utilities, and Financial market players such as hedge 
funds. Figure 1 shows shares of sectors among 530 
voting members in the PJM as of February 2019. 
 
 
Figure 1: PJM stakeholders by sector 
 
Each stakeholder can cast one vote per proposed 
alternative – yes, no, or abstain – and a proposed 
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alternative is adopted if it receives two-thirds majority 
votes. PJM implements sector-weighted voting that 
gives equal weight to all five sectors. As a result, each 
sector gets 20% of the total voting score, and each 
sector’s voting score represents a share of favoring votes 
of that sector excluding abstention votes. In other words, 
individual voters within the same sector share the one 
score and are inversely weighted by the number of 
voters of its sector. If the total voting score, or the sum 
of those score contributions, exceeds the threshold, then 
a voting issue would pass. The final voting score V is 
defined as:  
 𝑽 = 𝑤$%('()*(),-.% = 𝛿,%𝑛% − 𝑎%
('()*()
,-.% 													(1) 
 
In (1), 𝛿,% is an indicator variable equal to one if a voter 
i in sector k votes yes and zero if the voter votes no.  𝑛% 
is the total number of voters in sector k, and 𝑎% is the 
number of abstention votes in sector k. A voting item 
passes if its final voting score V is greater than 3.335. 
This implies that any two sectors could jointly prevent 
passage regardless of the number of voters in those 
sectors or the votes in other sectors. 
Prior work [2-4] describes how this voting system 
has contributed to difficulties in capacity market reform 
in PJM. These difficulties are illustrated in Table 1, 
which shows the calculation of the voting score V for six 
different VRR curve proposals considered in 2011. All 
six failed (including the option to make no changes to 
the VRR curve). The proposals themselves are shown 
visually in Figure 2. As [2,4] describe, those proposals 
that would have increased capacity prices (Packages 1, 
10 and 11 in Figure 1) were defeated by the strong end-
user coalition. Those proposals that would have 
decreased capacity prices (Packages 12 and 13) failed 
because of the actions of a small number of swing 
voters. After the voting process could not produce a 
passable reform to the VRR curve, PJM filed its 
preferred option (Package 1 in Figure 2) with FERC. 
Other things equal, Package 1 would have produced the 
largest increase in capacity prices relative to the status 
quo. 
 
Table 1: Capacity market voting outcomes 
(Blumsack and Yoo, 2017) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: VRR proposals considered by PJM 
stakeholders. Source: Author calculations 
based on [17]. 
 
2.2. The New York ISO Voting Rule  
 
Similar to PJM, voters in NYISO also have the same 
option per proposed voting issue – yes, no and abstain. 
There are, however, a few differences in terms of sector 
composition and sector weight as shown in Table 2. The 
most significant differences for our analysis are that the 
sectors are not equally weighted in NYISO (recall that 
each sector in PJM gets a 20% weight), and the passage 
threshold is 58%, which is lower than the 66.67% 
threshold in PJM.  
 
Table 2: Voting structures in PJM and NYISO 
 
 
 
Another difference is that NYISO has a Public 
Power sector and not an Electric Distributor sector as 
does PJM. There is, however, substantial overlap 
between the two sectors in terms of the kinds of 
companies falling under each. Our analysis here will 
thus treat them as equivalent (in other words, we assume 
that a firm in the Electric Distributor sector would be 
placed in the Public Power sector if that firm were 
located in New York). 
 
2.3. Preference Voting Rules 
In addition to the sector-weighted voting rules used 
by PJM and NYISO, we also model capacity market 
Status Quo Package 1 Package 10 Package 11 Package 12 Package 13
Transmission 
Owner 0.083 0.8 0.75 0.167 0.167 0.333
Generation 
Owner 0.071 0.833 0.714 0.077 0.231 0.267
End Use 
Customer 0.083 0 0 0.909 1 1
Electric 
Distributor 0.043 0 0 0.913 0.913 1
Other Supplier 0.056 0.667 0.323 0.235 0.25 0.513
Voting Score and 
Result
0.336 2.3 1.787 2.301 2.561 3.113
Failed Failed Failed Failed Failed Failed
PJM NYISO
Passage threshold 66.67% 58%
Sector and 
sector weight
Generation owners 20% Generation owners 21.5%
Other suppliers 20% Other suppliers 21.5%
Transmission owners 20% Transmission owners 20%
End-Use Consumers 20% End-Use Consumers 20%
Electric Distributor 20% Public Power 17%
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outcomes under three preference voting models: Instant 
runoff voting, the Coombs rule and the Borda count. 
Instant runoff voting (IRV) is a preferential voting 
procedure with elimination. Voters in IRV rank all 
alternatives based on their preference. In the initial 
round, the first choices are counted and the winner is the 
alternative that gets first-place votes greater than or 
equal to a threshold. If no alternative surpasses the 
threshold, then the candidate with the fewest number of 
first-place votes is eliminated. Those voters whose first 
choice was eliminate see their votes distributed among 
other alternatives based on their second-place vote. This 
process of elimination continues until one alternative 
surpasses the threshold. Although IRV is often criticized 
for perplexity – it asks voters to specify their full 
preference over all alternatives which requires deeper 
understandings and thus more time [18], the proponents 
of IRV claim that IRV is comparatively resistant to 
strategic voting among preferential voting, increases 
probability for minority representation, and reduces cost 
in case of multiple runoffs are required [19-21]. 
The Coombs rule is similar to IRV. It requires voters 
to rank all alternatives and the procedure of elimination 
and transfer of votes continues until a winner is elected. 
The difference from IRV is the elimination rule – when 
there is no winner, the Coombs rule eliminates the 
alternative that receives the largest number of last-place 
votes. 
The Borda count [22] is a voting procedure that has 
been considered extensively in the political science 
literature (the literature on this is large, but [23,24] are 
examples). Similar to the IRV and the Coombs rule, 
voters under the Borda count are required to rank 
alternatives in a preference order. If the number of 
alternatives is n, the procedure assigns a score of (n-1) 
to the first-place alternative, a score of (n-2) to the 
second-place alternative, and so forth. The lowest-
ranked alternative receives a score of zero. After 
combining scores from all voters, the alternative with 
the highest total score wins.  
 
3. Modeling Capacity Markets  
 
3.1. Construction of the capacity market 
simulation model 
Section 2.1 described the failure of stakeholders in 
PJM to approve (by vote) any reforms to the VRR curve 
used in PJM’s capacity market. The candidate VRR 
curves are shown in Figure 2, and our voting model will 
determine which of the VRR curves (if any) is 
ultimately adopted. This chosen VRR curve will serve 
as our capacity demand curve for capacity market 
simulations under alternative stakeholder voting 
structures. 
PJM does not publish detailed data on the shape of 
the capacity offer curve. To estimate this curve, we 
employ data from the sensitivity analysis that was 
conducted by PJM [25] and from the analysis report of 
the market monitor of PJM [26] covering the capacity 
market for delivery in 2015/2016. These sensitivity 
analyses provide information on what the capacity 
market clearing price and quantity would have been 
under different scenarios (e.g., more or less supply 
offered). For the purposes of this analysis, we do not 
consider special products in our capacity supply model, 
such as Extended Summer Demand Response. We also 
do not model zonal capacity price separation, which 
often occurs in PJM. Our estimated supply curve is 
shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3: Simulated PJM capacity offer curve. 
The candidate VRR curves are also shown.  
 
We use the results of two scenarios from PJM’s 
analysis: the first scenario assumes the annual supply 
increases by 6,000 MW from the bottom of the supply 
curve, shifting the supply curve to the right; the second 
scenario assume the supply decreases by the same 
amount, shifting the supply curve to the left. 
Information from this sensitivity analysis give us three 
actual data points of the original supply curve: the actual 
market clearing point (point 4 in Figure 3), the first 
scenario’s market clearing price at the clearing capacity 
of the base scenario minus 6,000 MW (point 3 in Figure 
3), and the second scenario’s market clearing price at the 
clearing capacity of the base scenario plus 6,000 MW 
(point 5 in Figure 3).  
We also used two pieces of information from the 
market monitor report [26] to build our capacity offer 
curve. According to the report, 77% of the cleared 
capacity offered at or below $35/MW-day. Assuming 
that the most expensive unit of the 77% offered at 
$35/MW-day, the first data point is set at $35/MW-day 
and 77% of the cleared capacity (point 3 in figure 3). 
The second data point is based on the assumption that 
the last (or the most expensive) unit of the cleared 
capacity offered at the price cap (point 6 in Figure 3). 
The end point of the flat portion (point 1 in Figure 3) is 
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arbitrarily set, since in the context of this analysis it does 
not affect the clearing price result. Based on the five 
identified points, we construct the capacity offer curve 
as a piecewise function. The first segment assumes an 
offer price of zero (this is a strong assumption but does 
not affect our results). The second segment is a linear 
function connecting the end of the flat portion, 
$35/MW-day offer point (point 2), and then to the first 
scenario point (point 3). The third segment is a quadratic 
function connecting the two scenario data points (points 
3 and 5), the actual market clearing point (point 4), and 
the price cap point (point 6).   
 
3.2. Sensitivity of capacity market outcomes 
to the chosen VRR curve 
 
The capacity market model described in Section 3.1 
allows for a comparative statics analysis to simulate 
different market clearing outcomes based on the chosen 
VRR curve. These simulated outcomes are shown in 
Table 3 and Figure 4. 
 
Table 3: Modeled capacity market outcomes 
under different VRR curves 
 
  
Of the VRR curves considered by stakeholders in 
PJM, Packages 1 and 10 would have generated higher 
clearing prices, other things being equal (1.11% higher 
and 0.08% higher than the status quo). The remaining 
proposals (Packages 11, 12 and 13) would have lowered 
clearing prices relative to the status quo, other things 
being equal (0.28% to 2.3% lower than the status quo). 
Based on our estimated supply curve, the difference 
between Packages 1 and 13 would have amounted to 
$256 million in capacity revenue for a single delivery 
year, and would have changed the clearing quantity by 
1%, relative to the target installed capacity margin. 
These outcomes will be sensitive to the shape of the 
capacity offer curve around the market clearing point, 
which we discuss further in Section 4. 
 
 
Figure 3: Illustrating the sensitivity of capacity 
market outcomes to the chosen VRR curve.  
 
 
4. The Impact of Voting Rules on 
Capacity Market Outcomes  
 
This section describes how the application of 
different voting rules in PJM (as described in Section 2) 
affect the choice of VRR parameters and thus capacity 
market outcomes. We state at the outset that an 
important assumption made throughout our analysis is 
that the stakeholder’s voting behavior does not change 
when voting rule changes and modeling voting behavior 
under different voting rules remains as future work. 
While lowering the passage threshold (as in NYISO) is 
relatively clear in application, modeling preferential 
voting requires some care. Preferential voting requires 
voters to specify their full preference order without 
omitting any proposed alternatives. In the historical data 
on VRR curve votes in PJM in 2011, however, there are 
a considerable number of abstentions. This means that 
some stakeholders in PJM votes yes or no on some of 
the VRR curve alternatives but not others. Where voter 
preferences are not clear, we use a Monte Carlo 
approach to generate simulated voting outcomes. This 
allows us to examine whether outcomes under different 
voting systems are robust to uncertainty over voter 
preferences. 
 
4.1. Modeling voter preferences 
 
Based on prior work [2,4] we develop relative 
preference orders over the VRR curve parameter 
packages (Figure 2) based on the votes of actual 
stakeholders in 2011, which we obtained from PJM 
[27]. This data set also contains information on 
individual stakeholders (including their industry sector, 
line of business and asset holdings) that we can use to 
develop a preference order where the voting record may 
VRR Curve 
(Ref. Fig. 2)
Clearing Price 
($/MW-day, 
UCAP)
Clearing 
Quantity 
(MW, UCAP)
Total market 
payment
($/day)
% change in 
Price 
compared to 
Status quo
% change in 
Quantity 
compared to 
Status quo
Status Quo 128.90 164,340 21,183,426 
Package 1 130.64 164,470 21,486,361 1.35% 0.08%
Package 10 129.16 164,360 21,228,738 0.20% 0.01%
Package 11 128.54 164,310 21,120,407 -0.28% -0.02%
Package 12 126.42 164,140 20,750,579 -1.92% -0.12%
Package 13 125.93 164,110 20,666,372 -2.30% -0.14%
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be ambiguous. Stakeholders that we identify as 
consumers are assumed to prefer lower capacity clearing 
prices over higher prices. Their preference would be in 
the following order: package 13 (being the favorite for 
setting the lowest clearing price), package 12, package 
11, status quo, package 10, and package 1 (being the 
least favorite for setting the highest clearing price). 
Stakeholders that we identify as suppliers would have 
the opposite preference order. Following this intuitive 
preference order, we assign number one to the favorite 
proposal (package 13 for the consumers and package 1 
for the suppliers) and six to the least favorite (package 1 
for the consumers and package 13 for the suppliers) by 
preference types.  
As in [2] and [4] the preference modeling approach 
that we employ does have some limitations and some 
strong underlying assumptions. In particular, we assume 
that each voter will develop a preference ordering based 
only on its own payoffs under each capacity market 
proposal. We do not consider the potential for 
preference ordering to be influenced by coalition 
formation [28-30], nor do we consider any dynamic or 
game-theoretic dimensions of these preference 
orderings. These assumptions are fairly strong and 
limiting, but represent clear opportunities for further 
development of these kinds of voting models and 
implications of RTO governance structures. 
We next categorize three preference types that we 
are able to divine from the historical voting data: Clear 
preferences that is consistent with our “consumer” or 
“supplier” stakeholder model; Abstention for those 
stakeholders with two or more abstentions in the voting 
data that makes their preference somewhat ambiguous; 
and Inconsistent preferences that contains mixed 
signals. These “inconsistent” stakeholders voted yes to 
both increasing and decreasing clearing price proposals, 
or there are too many abstention votes to identify their 
preference order.  
For the clear preference type, there are two groups 
of preference order as described in the previous 
paragraph – the consumer group of 48 voters and the 
supplier group of 36 voters. The abstentions preference 
type also has the consumer and the supplier groups. We 
assign the values in the same way as we did for the clear 
preference type but only to proposals that voters 
specified their preference and leave blanks for proposals 
that received abstain vote. For example, two 
stakeholders in our data set voted yes to package 1 and 
abstained for all the other proposals. In this case, we 
assume that the stakeholder’s most preferred option is 
package 1 for its preference order and leave blank for 
the others. Lastly, for the inconsistent preference type, 
we assume that they have random preferences and leave 
their preference order entirely blank. 
Overall, there are 85 stakeholders in our data set 
whose preferences we categorize as clear, 11 
stakeholders in our data set whose preferences we 
categorize as abstainers and 12 stakeholders whose 
preferences we describe as inconsistent. 
Blank votes for the abstention and inconsistent 
groups are filled in using a Monte Carlo approach. 
Stakeholders in the inconsistent group have random 
preference orders generated. To generate a complete 
preference order for stakeholders in the abstention 
group, we first generate a preference ordering among the 
yes and no votes, and then randomly complete the 
preference order.  
 
Table 4: Examples of modeling ambiguity in 
stakeholder preferences 
 
 
Examples of this procedure are shown in Table 4. 
Panel (a) shows an actual stakeholder who voted yes 
only to Package 1 and abstained for all the others. We 
assume that Package 1 is this voter’s most preferred 
option, and randomly generate a preference order over 
the other five VRR curve options. Panel (b) shows an 
actual stakeholder who voted no to Packages 1 and 10, 
Yes to Package 13, and abstention to the rest. In this 
case, we assume that Packages 1 and 10 are the least 
preferred, while Package 13 is the most preferred. The 
preference order over the other voting options are 
randomly assigned. 
For each stakeholder whose preferences fell into the 
abstention or inconsistent categories, we generated 
1,000 realizations to complete the preference order. 
 
4.2. Simulating Capacity Market Rule 
Outcomes 
 
This section provides the results of our voting 
outcomes analysis. We model the stakeholder voting 
process to choose VRR curve parameters under the 
different voting mechanisms described in Section 2. 
Recall that when these VRR curve parameters were 
voted upon by PJM stakeholders, none of the proposed 
alternatives (including the alternative to make no 
changes to the VRR curve) were able to pass, and 
despite this PJM chose to file with FERC the VRR curve 
corresponding to Package 1. We will discuss three sets 
of results in this section. The first set of results discusses 
VRR Curve 
(Ref. Fig. 2)
Actual 
Vote
Preference 
Order
Package 1 Yes Most Preferred
Package 10 Abstain Random
Status Quo Abstain Random
Package 11 Abstain Random
Package 12 Abstain Random
Package 13 Abstain Random
VRR Curve 
(Ref. Fig. 2)
Actual 
Vote Preference Order
Package 1 No Least Preferred
Package 10 No 5th Most Preferred
Status Quo Abstain Random
Package 11 Abstain Random
Package 12 Abstain Random
Package 13 Yes Most Preferred
(a) (b)
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how imposing the NYISO voting structure onto PJM 
would change the outcome of the VRR curve voting 
process. The second set provides results of imposing a 
preferential voting system in PJM, but retaining the PJM 
passage threshold of 66.67%. The third set of results 
layers the NYISO passage threshold of 58% onto the 
preferential voting analysis. 
We first describe the results of imposing the NYISO 
passage threshold in the PJM stakeholder process. The 
modeled voting outcomes are shown in Table 5. When 
we impose the NYISO sector-weighted voting structure 
onto the PJM stakeholder group, we make a few 
assumptions. We first assume that voters’ decisions 
would not change under different threshold and sector 
weights. We also assume a straightforward translation 
of industry sectors in NYISO to those in PJM (see Table 
2). For example, we assume voters in the Generation 
Owner sector of PJM corresponds to the Generation 
Owner sector in NYISO (which has a greater weight 
than PJM). We translate the Electric Distributor sector 
in PJM to the Public Power sector in NYISO as 
previously explained. After changing the threshold to 
58% from 66.67% and the sector weights (see table 5), 
the results show that all proposals would fail except 
Package 13.  
 
Table 5: VRR curve voting outcomes with the 
NYISO voting structure 
 
 
 
We next describe the results of our voting outcomes 
analysis under preferential voting. Because of the 
ambiguity of voter preferences in some cases and our 
Monte Carlo method of addressing this, we obtain 
distributions for voting outcomes rather than a single 
outcome (as in Table 5). 
We first note that in all of our simulations, Package 
13 was the chosen VRR curve alternative for the Instant 
Runoff Voting and Coombs models. When these voting 
systems are used in PJM, our model suggests a high 
level of robustness in the outcome regardless of any 
uncertainty over voter preferences. 
The Borda Count voting model generated a greater 
variety of results, as shown in Table 6. In some cases, 
Package 11 or 12 was the winning alternative rather than 
Package 13. More than 80% of the time, however, 
Package 13 was the winning alternative. This was true 
regardless of the level of the passage threshold. 
 
Table 6: VRR voting outcomes under the Borda 
Count voting system, with the PJM and NYISO 
voting threshold (out of 1,000 simulations) 
 
 
 
 
5. Impacts of Voting Structures on 
Capacity Market Clearing  
 
As described in [2,4], PJM’s current voting system 
has had difficulties in the passage of market rule 
changes in contentious issues such as capacity markets. 
In Section 4, we found that other voting procedures, 
such as a lower passage threshold or preferential voting 
would produce a passable voting proposal (we do not 
claim that the outcome produced would be good or bad 
for the system as a whole, only that the introduction of 
preferential voting or a lower passage threshould could 
lead to some outcome passing). We noted that the 
alternative voting structures that we considered would 
have the effect of reinforcing the political power held by 
consumer-side interests [2]. In this section we use the 
capacity market model developed in Section 3 to 
estimate the market impacts of the VRR curves that 
alternative voting structures may have passed.  
As discussed in Section 5, IRV and Coombs choose 
package 13 and Borda count selects among package 11, 
12 and 13 with probability of 4%, 15%, and 81%, 
respectively. Table 7 combines this information with the 
clearing price that our capacity market model suggests 
would emerge from each of the proposals. Modeled 
market clearing prices from these procedures are lower 
than the status quo outcome by around $2.92/MW-day, 
and lower than the prices prevailing under Package 1 
(which was selected by PJM after stakeholders failed to 
pass any of the alternatives) by $4.15/MW-day. 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity of capacity prices to voting 
structure 
 
Status 
Quo
Package 
1
Package 
10
Package 
11
Package 
12
Package 
13
Generation 
Owner 0.071 0.833 0.714 0.077 0.231 0.267
Transmission 
Owner 0.083 0.8 0.75 0.167 0.167 0.333
Other Supplier 0.056 0.667 0.323 0.235 0.25 0.513
Electric 
Distributor 0.043 0 0 0.913 0.913 1
End Use 
Customer 0.083 0 0 0.909 1 1
Voting Score 
and Result
0.067 0.483 0.373 0.437 0.492 0.604
Failed Failed Failed Failed Failed Pass
PJM Threshold
(66.7%)
NYISO Threshold
(58%)
Package 11 2 42
Package 12 112 148
Package 13 886 810
Voting Procedures Voting Outcome
Simulation 
results*
PJM 
(NYISO)
Clearing Price 
($/MW-day)
% changes in 
Price compared 
to Status quo
% changes in 
Price compared 
to Package 1
Preferential 
voting
IRV Package 13 100% 125.93 -2.30% -3.61%
Coombs Package 13 100% 125.93 -2.30% -3.61%
Borda 
Count
Package 11 1% (4%) 128.54 -0.28% -1.61%
Package 12 11% (15%) 126.42 -1.92% -3.23%
Package 13 88% (81%) 125.93 -2.30% -3.61%
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5.1. Sensitivity analysis  
 
This section repeats the capacity market analysis 
under two sensitivity analyses that could reasonably 
affect capacity prices. The first involves changing the 
Cost of New Entry (CONE), which acts as the price cap 
in the capacity market. The second involves changing 
the supply elasticity at the market-clearing point, 
making the supply curve steeper. 
Figure 4 summarizes the sensitivity analysis for the 
level of the CONE. The x-axis shows market clearing 
prices ($/MW-day) and y-axis (left) represents the 
likelihood of observing the indicated clearing price or 
lower, based on our simulations. Dotted markers 
indicate outcomes from IRV or Coombs, and shaded 
markers display outcomes of Borda count. The shapes 
of the points represent the voting outcome given the 
voting procedure and the policy factor variation. Circle 
indicates package 13 as a voting result; square 
represents package 12; triangle represents package 11; 
diamond shape represents the status quo. Our result 
shows that policy variations do not change the 
probabilities of voting outcome (the right-hand y-axis) 
except one type of variation – increase in CONE value 
under Borda count. Due to increase in the CONE value, 
package 11’s VRR curve becomes higher than that of 
the status quo VRR curve. In this case, the status quo 
VRR curve is the preferred outcome in a small number 
of our trials (4%) instead of Package 11 (0%) while the 
chances of Package 12 (14%) and Package 13 (82%) as 
a voting outcome remain identical. The picture also 
distinguishes variations in CONE values by setting 
different colors and line types to each variation. The 
blue solid line represents voting outcomes with the 
original CONE. Left of the blue line represents 
outcomes associated with lower CONE values and those 
to the right are associated with higher CONE values.  
 
 
Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis on the level of the 
CONE.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates that without any changes in the 
CONE value (original), under Borda count there is about 
81 per cent chance that the clearing price would be 
around $126.25/MW-day which is proposed by package 
13; 96 per cent chance that the clearing price would be 
around $126.6/MW-day or less, or 15 per cent 
incremental chance that the clearing price would be 
around $126.6/MW-day which is suggested by package 
12; 100 per cent chance that the clearing price would be 
$128.2/MW-day or less, or 4 per cent incremental 
chance that the clearing price would be $128.2/MW-day 
that is what package 11 proposes. In comparison, under 
RCV with original policy factors, the clearing price 
would be $126.25/MW-day by one hundred per cent 
chance. 
We also perform a sensitivity analysis on the 
elasticity of supply at the market clearing point.. The 
price elasticities of supply range from 0.0656 to 0.1656 
which shows that the supply in the capacity market is 
generally inelastic at the market clearing point. Since at 
the clearing price point the price elasticity of the supply 
is the lowest (0.0656), we mostly increase the elasticity 
to show market prices when other supplies that have 
higher price elasticity clear the market. Yet, we still 
consider a few cases in which more inelastic supply 
offer appear. To change the price elasticity of the supply 
at the clearing price point, we shift the supply curve at 
and to the right of the market clearing point 
(corresponding to shifting points 4, 5 and 6 in Figure 3 
by identical percentages). 
 
 
Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis on the elasticity 
of supply.  
 
Figure 5 illustrates our sensitivity analysis of the 
supply price elasticity at the clearing price point. The 
curves in Figure 5 correspond to each proposed shape of 
the VRR curve. For each proposed VRR curve, Figure 5 
shows how the clearing price would change under that 
VRR curve for various values of the supply elasticity. 
As the price elasticity increases, the difference between 
clearing prices of the status quo VRR curve and Package 
13 tend to decrease. For example, with the original price 
elasticity of supply, 0.0656, the clearing price of the 
package 13 is $125.93/MW-day while that of the status 
Page 3094
quo is $128.90/MW-day. If the elasticity increases to 
0.0757, the clearing price of Package 13 is 
$119.17/MW-day and that of the status quo is 
$121.58/MW-day. The difference has decreased from 
$2.97/MW-day to $2.41/MW-day and this difference is 
smaller when the elasticity is 0.1651, the highest among 
our scenarios, which is $0.66/MW-day. The result is 
consistent with a geometric interpretation of the supply 
and the VRR curve in Figure 2. From point b to point c, 
the various VRR curves converge on one another as they 
meet at the point c. Therefore, as the supply curve is 
getting flatter, or as the price elasticity of the supply 
increases, the difference between clearing prices of the 
highest VRR curve and the lowest VRR curve would 
decrease. 
 
7. Conclusion and Future Work  
 
This study shows how the decision processes for 
establishing market rules in RTOs can materially affect 
market outcomes and investment incentives. We 
develop a modeling approach that can explicitly connect 
RTO rule-making decision systems with market 
outcomes, and illustrate it using a unique data set related 
to a series of capacity market votes.  
Under PJM’s current stakeholder voting structure, it 
can be difficult to reach an agreement that could be 
supported by two-thirds majority for divisive issues. We 
found that if PJM were to adopt alternative rules such as 
NYISO voting structure or preferential voting system, 
such a mechanism would more easily lead to passage of 
market rule changes for the capacity market. In the case 
that we studied, the outcome that would emerge favors 
the interests of consumers, producing lower capacity 
prices but also reducing PJM’s installed capacity 
margin. Because of the structure of the stakeholder 
group in PJM, we believe that the political power 
enjoyed by consumer-side interests in our capacity 
market case study would extend to other issues, but we 
leave more detailed exploration as a matter for further 
research. 
We do not claim that our modeled outcomes are 
better or worse than the actual outcomes that prevailed 
in the 2011 capacity market redesign exercise. Our 
analysis provides a framework for connecting RTO 
governance structures to market outcomes that can be 
used to evaluate the market or system impacts of 
governance decisions.  
Our analysis provides evidence that voting rules can 
have a measurable impact on market outcomes which 
would affect two-thirds of the U.S. electricity 
consumption. While the magnitude of these market 
impacts are small in some cases, they are highly 
sensitive to other market and policy variables. We 
conclude that the impact of RTO governance structures 
on market outcomes is not negligible for capacity 
investment specifically. Whether this extends to other 
market products or elements of power grid operations is 
an avenue for potentially fruitful research. 
This study also provides a good background to a 
comparison analysis across RTOs. Although we do not 
directly address difference in governance structures 
across RTOs and its consequences–except a passage 
threshold comparison with PJM and NYISO–the result 
that shows changes in voting outcomes under different 
voting rules is sufficient to further develop a research 
what these differences mean. We are not arguing that 
RTO governing rules have to be the same across 
different RTOs. All RTOs have developed their own 
rules over time based on countless debate and discussion 
that reflect distinct regional characteristics. However, 
we see few studies on comparing rule differences even 
though it could make non-negligible impact on the 
markets. 
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